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A critical examination of its method(s) belongs to the core business of philosophy from 
its beginnings. In recent discussion, however, metaphilosophical issues have gained an 
especially prominent role. As a constant flood of publications shows, metaphilosophy and 
philosophical metholodogy are among the areas in which the current debates are most lively.1 
The international conference hosted in 2017 by the Faculty of Philosophy of the Università 
Vita-Salute San Raffaele, and organised by Elisabetta Sacchi, Sarah Songhorian and Stefano 
Bacin with the support of the research centres CESEP, CRESA, CRISI, DIAPOREIN, GENDER, 
and PERSONA, aimed at gathering contributions on methodological issues in different fields 
of current philosophical studies: analytic philosophy, ethics, phenomenology, philosophy 
and gender issues, and history of ideas. The sections of this issue include most of the papers 
presented at that conference.
If there is a philosophical perspective that started as an intellectual endeavour based on a 
revolutionary methodology, which through decades brought original philosophical questions 
to light, it is analytic philosophy. In this spirit, Timothy Williamson scrutinises the analytic 
attitude towards testing philosophical theories via a falsificationist methodology. Though still 
widespread in the analytic community, a falsificationist methodology might be less fruitful 
and more prone to error than a more flexible alternative brought forward by Williamson, 
namely the reliance on model-building, carried over into the philosophical debate from 
empirical and social sciences.
Williamson’s contribution is followed by two papers devoted to two methodological divides 
in the analytic tradition. The first divide, which is a more classical one, concerns whether, in 
the analysis of core philosophical notions such as the notion of reference of singular terms, 
a methodological approach in terms of formal theories and their models versus an approach 
focusing on the analysis of natural language is preferable. This divide informs Francesca 
Boccuni’s contribution.
Bianca Cepollaro’s article, on the other hand, concerns the linguistic intuitions connected with 
the use of certain expressives such as derogatory terms in the light of the second, more recent, 
1  See e.g. the very diverse picture provided by two recent handbooks: Cappelen, Szabó Gendler & Hawthorne (2016) 
and D’Oro & Overgaard (2017). For a more recent, significant sample of the debate, see Baz 2018, along with the review 
by Cappelen & Deutsch (2018), and Williamson (2007, 2018).
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divide in the analytic tradition: whether the analysis of central philosophical notions should 
be carried out via a methodology relying exclusively on theoretical investigation (the so-called 
“armchair philosophy”) or via an experimental approach. 
The title of this special issue echoes that of a philosophical masterpiece that put 
methodological issues in the foreground, thereby marking a perspective that is still very much 
at the centre of the debate, namely Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics. Both papers of the 
section on ethics follow this connection and take their lead from Sidgwick’s views. 
Roger Crisp examines Sidgwick’s understanding of ‘method’ and his methodological practice. 
After considering Sidgwick’s conditions of proper self-evidence of intuitions and some limits 
in his assessment of ‘dogmatic intuitionism’, Crisp suggests in this light a more constructive 
debate between advocates of different normative theories as a methodological guideline in 
moral philosophy. 
Massimo Reichlin points out an issue in Sidgwick’s talk of a method of ethics that still affects 
current debates. Reichlin argues that Sidgwick’s construal of the three methods of ethics yields 
an infelicitous confusion between methods and normative theories of morality, which has in 
turn brought a consequentialist bias in the debates of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
In the first paper devoted to aspects of the phenomenological approach, Dermot Moran 
underscores the holistic nature of phenomenology. Moran examines the main features of 
phenomenology, characterising it as a philosophical method that, in opposition to objectivist 
naturalism, grounds on an investigation of the a priori relations between subjectivity and the 
different domains of objectivity. 
Sara Heinämaa investigates a Husserlian distinction between two ways of understanding other 
persons, their motivations and actions: the empirical way and the genuinely intuitive way, 
crucially grounded, according to Heinämaa’s interpretation of Husserl, on self-understanding. 
Both self-understanding and understanding of others enable ethical reflections, self-
shaping and judgements on others, by being not confined to the actual but by opening to the 
possibilities of change and renewal.
Roberta Lanfredini compares phenomenological empiricism with classical empiricism, on the 
one hand, and logical empiricism, on the other. She argues that phenomenology is a kind of 
radical, though not reductionist, empiricism that is to be assimilated neither to the first strain 
of empiricism nor to the second.
Roberta De Monticelli tackles some traditional philosophical issues revolving around the 
notion of value. She proposes a phenomenological answer in terms of Scheler’s material 
axiology to the vexed questions concerning the cultural versus the universal source of values 
and the truth and falsehood of value judgements. This proposal is spelled out in terms of a 
clarification of the bottom-up phenomenological approach , which De Monticelli supports via 
experimental phenomenology.
The fourth section of the volume is devoted to the debate concerning some philosophical 
considerations regarding gender issues, which have now established not merely as an object 
of philosophical analysis, but as a topic of metaphilosophical significance. This is fittingly 
illustrated in Marina Sbisà’s paper, which investigates several ways in which the discourse 
on gender can be tackled philosophically, examines the difficulties and limitations of each 
of them and proposes a consideration of gendered subjectivity in intersubjective relations 
understood as a basic process in human life.
Laura Caponetto focuses on the role that feminist philosophy of language has ascribed 
to Austin’s theory of speech acts to account for the notion of silencing in the debate on 
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pornography and censorship. The article’s aim is to discuss Austin’s theory in order to unveil a 
form of discourse injustice that has been largely undernoticed.
The final section gathers papers that do not directly address methodological issues, but 
exemplify a historical-critical approach. The paper included in this section revolve around two 
foci: central aspects of Descartes’ epistemology and their reception in Spinoza, and the current 
debate on the so-called “Italian Theory”.
In the first group of papers, Marcos Gleizer defends Spinoza’s solution of the circle between 
evidence and that would affect Descartes’ epistemology at its core. Against most readings, 
Gleizer argues that Spinoza’s thesis of the “self-manifestation of reason” allows him to avoid 
the circularity between the truth of clear and distinct ideas, and God’s existence.
Descartes’ conception of the eternal truths is under scrutiny in the two following papers. Ethel 
Rocha considers some epistemological consequences of Descartes’ conception of the divine 
creation of the eternal truths. Finally, Rocha argues that view seems to commit Descartes 
to the impossibility for the human mind to fully grasp the truth, but this in turn stands in 
tension with Descartes’ entire metaphysical project. In his paper, Alfredo Gatto explores the 
connection between Descartes’ thesis of God’s free creation of the eternal truths and the 
idea of a theodicy, to argue that Leibniz’ and Malebranche’s project of a theodicy entails the 
rejection of the basi tenets of Descartes’ thesis. 
Finally, two papers are devoted to recent debates on Italian philosophy. Corrado Claverini 
sketches a genealogy of the recent debates on what has been labelled “Italian Thought” and 
the grounds of the growing international reception of Italian philosophy. Focusing on one 
defining moment in that debate, that is, Roberto Esposito’s Living Thought, Raffaele Ariano 
points out in the reconstruction of an Italian philosophical tradition the striving to overcome 
the boundaries of academic philosophy, and the role played by the interpretation of Spinoza’s 
thought in the ontological transformation of Michel Foucault’s idea of biopolitics.
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